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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this petition pursuant to
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) and § 35-1-86
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the Industrial Commission err in granting Mr. Broadbent
interest on his permanent partial disability award from the date
his disability impairment rating was determined by a medical
panel when, up to that point, many doctors had been unable to
agree on his impairment rating and his condition had not
stabilized?
STATUTES AND RULES
The following statute and rule are controlling:
1.

Section 35-1-78 Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended):

Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award-Authority to destroy records—Interest on award—No
authority to change statutes of limitation.

(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise
become due and payable.
2.

Rule 490-1-12B.2. U.A.C. (1991) Interest.
*

*

*

For the purpose of interest calculation,
benefits shall become "due and payable" (as used
in Section 35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows:

-1-

2. Permanent partial compensation shall be
due and payable on the next day following the
termination of a temporary total disability.
However, where the condition is not fixed for
rating purposes, the interest shall commence from
the date the permanent partial impairment can be
medically determined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings and
Disposition Below.
This case is a claim by an injured worker for additional
interest on his permanent partial disability compensation award.
The ALJ awarded petitioner, Mr. Broadbent, interest from the date
that a medical panel ascertained his disability rating.

Prior to

that time, several doctors, including Mr. Broadbentfs treating
physicians, had been unable to agree as to his disability rating,
and his condition had not become stable.

Both parties asked the

Industrial Commission to review the Order of the ALJ.1

The

Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ on the interest issue.
The Commission held that, under the applicable statute and rule,
interest was due from the date the liability of the respondents
was first medically determined.

(A copy of the Commission's

Order is attached hereto as Addendum A.)
Mr. Broadbent seeks reversal of the portion of the
Commission's Order which affirmed the ALJ's decision that Mr.
a

The parties asked the Industrial Commission to review
several issues, which it did, but the only issue on appeal here
is whether the Commission and the ALJ were correct in their
rulings on the interest issue.
-2-

Broadbent was entitled to interest on the permanent partial
disability compensation from December 23, 1991, the date the
medical panel established his impairment rating.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

Mr. Broadbent was injured on October 6, 1982 in a

work related accident, while employed by Tolboe Construction
Company.

(R. 3.)
2.

A few days after the accident, one of Mr.

Broadbentfs doctors opined that Mr. Broadbent would be able to
return to work after January 1983, and that it was "unknown at
present time" whether any permanent injury or disability would
result.

(R. 4.)
3.

Mr. Broadbent returned to work in July 1983, (R.

64), or September 1983,2 after being cleared for work as of June
9, 1983.

(R. 186.)
4.

In April 1983, Dr. Douglas Kirkpatrick opined that

Mr. Broadbent was "about 20% disabled . . . "

(R. 225.)

In

September 1984, Dr. Kirkpatrick gave Mr. Broadbent a 5%
disability rating.
5.

(R. 231.)

In May of 1987, Dr. Bruce Sorensen, one of Mr.

Broadbent?s treating physicians, gave him a 16% disability
rating.

(R. 262.)

2

Mr. Broadbent has alternatively represented that he
returned to work in September of 1983, (R. 10), and July of 1983,
(R. 64). It makes no difference which date he actually returned
to work for the issue presented here.
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6.

For various periods up to May 10, 1988, Mr.

Broadbent was paid temporary total disability benefits in the
total sum of $13,429.30.
7.

(R. 87, 88, 89, 91.) 3

On June 4, 1987, Tolboe Construction's insurer

offered $9431.11 to Mr. Broadbent as compensation for his
permanent partial disability.

This offer was based upon Dr.

Sorensenfs evaluation and rating of 16%.*
8.

Mr. Broadbent rejected the offer, and retained Dr.

Milton Thomas to render a second opinion.
4.)

(R. 90, 91.)

(Broadbent Brief at

On February 2, 1988, Dr. Thomas opined that Mr. Broadbent

had a 15% disability rating.

(R. 286.)

3

Mr. Broadbent takes the position that he was paid temporary
total disability only until June 1983. (Broadbent Brief at 2,
4.) This is incorrect. Temporary total disability payments were
made at various times through May 1988. (R. 88, 89 and 91.)
*Again, Mr. Broadbent has misstated what transpired in this
case. He states that, "From termination of TTD on June 9, 1983,
until approximately August 17, 1992, (the date of payment), there
was never a defense tender of the full amount owed." (Broadbent
Brief at 15.) Mr. Broadbent also states that, " . . . the
employer and his insurance cohorts can let the matter linger on
for years, like they did here . . . "
(Broadbent Brief at 14.)
These assertions are simply incorrect. The matter lingered on
because Mr. Broadbentfs own doctors could not agree on the
severity or stability of his injuries and, in 1987, the insurer
offered to pay disability benefits based upon the 16% rating
given by Dr. Sorensen, who had treated Mr. Broadbent for four
years. (R. 90, 91, 261, 262.) Mr. Broadbent rejected this
offer. Mr. Broadbentfs position that the insurer's tender, which
was based on his own doctor's evaluation was underhanded is
incredible and contrary to the evidence. Furthermore, the
insurer is not allowed to initiate a resolution of such disputes
before the Industrial Commission as Mr. Broadbent suggests.
(Broadbent Brief at 14.)
-4-

9.

In September of 1990, Dr. John Bender opined that

Mr. Broadbent had a 24% disability rating for physical impairment,
and a 12% disability relative to a loss of dexterity and a tremor
of the left hand which are apparently caused by Parkinson's
disease.

Dr. Bender also opined that "In review of these

extensive medical records, which cover the past 8 years, it is
apparent that Mr. Broadbent has a progressive problem which is
undoubtedly more impaired at this time than several years ago."
(Broadbent Brief at 4-5, R. 157, 160.)
10.

On October 2, 1990, Mr. Broadbent filed an

Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission.
11.

(R. 10.)

In December of 1990, Mr. Broadbent offered to

settle for $21,378.38, which included $14,826.24 for the 24%
disability found by Dr. Bender, $4953.34 for interest, $330 for
Dr. Benderfs office visit and $1268.80 for travel expenses.5
(R. 15-16.)
12.

On March 5, 1991, at the initial hearing on Mr.

Broadbentfs application, it was decided that the matter would be
referred to a medical panel after x-rays were received. (R. 19.)
The medical panel was asked to address the following questions:
a. Is the Parkinson's disease a result
of the industrial accident of 10-6-82?

5

In Mr. Broadbentfs Brief, he states that he offered to
settle for the 24% disability rating. (Broadbent Brief at 5.)
This is incorrect. The settlement offer included amounts for
interest, doctorfs bills and travel expenses. (R. 15-16.)
-5-

b. What is the permanent partial
impairment due to the industrial accident?
c. What is the permanent partial
impairment due to the pre-existing conditions?
d. Did the industrial accident
permanently aggravate a pre-existing condition?
(R. 41.)
13.

It took several months to gather the necessary

x-rays for reference to the medical panel.
14.
report.

(R. 28, 32, 36.)

On December 10, 1991, the medical panel issued its

The panel stated that the Parkinson's Disease was not

the result of the industrial accident of 10/6/82, and that Mr.
Broadbent was 23% disabled, of which 3% related to a pre-existing
condition.

(R. 44-56.)
15.

On March 9, 1992, the Administrative Law Judge

adopted the findings of the medical panel and granted Mr.
Broadbent relief consistent with the panelfs findings.

(R. 59-

61. )
16.

Both Mr. Broadbent and Tolboe Construction

requested the Industrial Commission to review certain aspects of
the ALJ's Order.
17.

(R. 64-70 and 75-80.)

On May 29, 1992, the Industrial Commission

affirmed the ALJ and found that "[t]here is substantial evidence
in light of the entire record to uphold the findings of the ALJ,
and his conclusions of law are appropriate under the
circumstances.

(R. 113-119; Addendum A.)
-6-

18.

On June 25, 1992, a Petition for Review was filed

with this court.

(R. 123.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under Mr. Broadbent1s interpretation of R490-1-12B.2. U.A.C.
(1991), interest is payable on permanent partial compensation if
the claimant's condition has stabilized, even though doctors may
not agree on the disability rating.

He argues that even though

the doctors who evaluated him did not agree on the impairment
rating, interest is still payable from the day following the
termination of temporary total disability because,
hypothetically, the rating could have been determined at that
time.

Mr. Broadbent argues that even though the many doctors who

evaluated him from 1983 to 1991, rated him anywhere from 5%
disabled to 34% disabled, the final rating of 23% could have been
found in 1983 and interest should be paid from that date. Under
this interpretation of the rule, or any other interpretation, the
evidence does not support the relief he seeks.
First, Mr. Broadbentfs temporary total disability payments
did not cease until May 1988. Therefore, according to the rule,
the earliest interest could begin to run, in any event, would be
May 11, 1988, the day following the termination of his temporary
benefits.

R490-1-12B.2. U.A.C. (1991).

Second, in September of

1990, Dr. John Bender performed an evaluation of Mr. Broadbent at
the request of Mr. Broadbentfs lawyer.

Dr. Bender opined that

Mr. Broadbentfs condition was becoming progressively worse.
-7-

Therefore, under R490-1-12B.2. Mr. Broadbentfs condition was not
fixed for rating purposes.

Dr. Bender's opinion is consistent

with the other doctor's inability to agree on an impairment
rating during the preceding years.

Therefore, the Industrial

Commission's award was correct, under R490-1-12B.2., and it is
supported by the evidence.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION'S ORDER OF MAY 29, 1992, AND IT
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
A.

Standard of Review.

Mr. Broadbent argues that the issue presented is a question
of law to which the Court employs a correction-of-error standard.
He also argues that the Court must "closely scrutinize the
Commission's order.

(Broadbent Brief at 6.)

While the first

part of Mr. Broadbent's position is correct, as far as it goes,
he cites no authority for the second proposition that the Court
must "closely scrutinize" the Commission's order.
Section 63-46b-16(4) Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended) sets
forth the standards an appellate court must follow in reviewing
formal adjudicative proceedings of a state agency.

That section

reads:
The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on
which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
-8-

(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction
conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues
requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or
applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful
procedure or decision-making process, or has
failed to follow prescribed procedure;
(f) the persons taking the agency action were
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or
were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i)
an abuse of the discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies the
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the
inconsistency; or
(iv)

otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

Mr. Broadbent does not delineate which of these sections, if
any, provide the relief he seeks.

It appears Mr. Broadbent

believes the issue is simply a question of law.

Respondents

submit the issue presented is a mixed question of law and fact.
First, was the applicable administrative rule interpreted
correctly and second, when was Mr. Broadbentfs condition fixed?
Also, when did his temporary total benefits terminate?
Therefore, the Court must accord the Commission's decision
some deference and set it aside only if it is unreasonable.

-9-

Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Comfn, 767 P.2d 524, 527
(Utah 1988).

The Court in Hurley explains:

There are essentially three standards that determine
the scope of judicial review of agency action. The
correction-of-error standard applies to agency rulings
on issues of law and extends no deference to agency
rulings. An agency's findings of fact, however, are
accorded substantial deference and will not be
overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if
another conclusion from the evidence is permissible.
As to questions of mixed law and fact, a reviewing
court usually accords an agency decision some
deference, i.e., an agency!s decision will not be set
aside unless the agency's conclusion is unreasonable.
Id. at 526, 527, citations and footnotes omitted.
In this case, the Court must also review the Commission's
interpretation of an administrative rule.

In that regard, an

agency's interpretation of its own regulation is accorded
judicial deference.

Concerned Parents of Stepchildren v.

Mitchell, 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 1982).

Also, "Courts will not

override an administrative agency's interpretation of its own
rules unless the interpretation is obviously arbitrary or
erroneous."

McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381

P.2d 726, 730 (Utah 1963).
The Court must also determine whether the Commission's
factual finding relative to the date Mr. Broadbent's condition
was fixed for rating purposes is supported by substantial
evidence.

-10-

B.

Question of Law.

As is set forth above, the Court must determine if the
Commission's interpretation of R490-1-12B.2. is obviously
arbitrary or erroneous.

R490-1-12B.2. requires, in pertinent

part, (emphasis added):
Permanent partial compensation shall be due and
payable on the next day following the termination of a
temporary total disability. However, where the
condition is not fixed for rating purposes, the
interest shall commence from the date the permanent
partial impairment can be medically determined.
Mr. Broadbent argues that the second sentence applies only
to situations where the claimant's physical condition is not
fixed, rather than situations where the condition is fixed but
the rating is in dispute.

Although it is not clear how the rule

was interpreted by the Industrial Commission, its decision was
correct under either interpretation.
The Commission's order states:
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in
ordering that interest on the PPD award commenced on
December 23, 1991, since that was the date that the
liability of the respondents was first medically
determined. We agree with the respondents on this
issue.
(R. 114.)

The Commission then cites § 35-1-78 (U.C.A.) and

R490-1-12 and notes that there are no allegations of bad faith or
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents.

6

(R. 115.) The

No caselaw has been found that interprets this rule. The
cases cited by Mr. Broadbent do not address this rule and,
therefore, do not directly address the issue before the Court.
-11-

Commission then concludes, "Under the circumstances, interest
accrues from the date of December 23, 1991, as correctly
determined by the ALJ." (Id.)

It appears that the Commission

interpreted R490-1-12B.2. to require that the impairment rating
be fixed, rather than the condition of the claimant.
Nevertheless, in this case, no matter which interpretation is
correct, the result of the Commissions decision is correct and
supported by the evidence.

Mr. Broadbentfs condition was not

fixed, according to Dr. Bender, as of late 1990, so the award of
interest from 1991, when his disability rating was confirmed by a
medical panel, was in accordance with R490-1-12B.2.
Mr. Broadbent cites the case of Heaton v. Second Injury
Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990) as support for his position.
reliance on that case is misplaced.

His

Heaton was a situation where

an injured worker had been totally disabled since he was injured
in 1975. The issue involved interest on a permanent total
disability award, not a permanent partial disability
determination.

Although the record in that case was, apparently,

somewhat confusing, there was no dispute that Mr. Heaton had been
totally disabled since his injury.

Id.

at 681. However, for

some reason, Mr. Heaton was paid permanent partial disability
compensation until October of 1981.
In 1985, Heaton requested a clarification of his rights.
Thereafter, Heaton applied for permanent total disability
benefits.

In November of 1985, an ALJ ordered that Heaton be
-12-

awarded permanent total disability benefits from July 25, 1985,
the date Heaton1s doctor reported that Heaton had never recovered
from the accident.

In his order, however, the ALJ conceded that

it appeared from the record that Heaton had been totally disabled
from the date of the accident.

The Industrial Commission upheld

the ALJfs decision and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission.
On a Writ of Certiorari, the Supreme Court of Utah held that
Heaton was entitled to permanent total disability payments,
including interest, from October 6, 1981, the date his permanent
partial disability benefits expired, rather than from July, 1985.
In its opinion, the Court states:
Since it is clear that he [Heaton] was totally and
permanently impaired from the time of the injury in
1985 to the time when permanent partial payments
terminated, he was indisputably entitled to permanent
total benefits as of the date of the termination of the
permanent partial benefits.
Id.
The significant factor in the Heaton case was that there was
no dispute that Heaton was totally disabled since the accident
and his condition was fixed as of that date.

That case is much

different than this case where neither the condition nor the
rating were fixed until 1991.
The case of Oman v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 735 P.2d
665 (Utah App.) cert denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987), is even
more applicable to this case.

In Oman, this Court held that the
-13-

date of medical confirmation of a permanent total disability in
progressive injury cases is the appropriate date for the
commencement of such benefits.

Oman sought a modification of an

order by the Industrial Commission awarding him permanent total
disability benefits.

The Commission had ordered benefits to

commence the date permanent total disability was first medically
confirmed.

Oman argued that benefits should commence from either

the date of the accident or the day he last worked for his
employer, whichever is later.

This Court affirmed the Industrial

Commissions decision and awarded Oman interest on his benefits,
pursuant to § 35-1-78 (U.C.A.), from the date his condition was
medically confirmed,

Id. at 667.

As in Oman, the Commissions order of May 29, 1992, which
granted Mr. Broadbent interest from the date his condition was
medically determined is a correct interpretation of the law.
C.

Question of fact.

The one fact that is absolutely clear in the record in this
case is that from 1983 until 1991, the numerous doctors who
evaluated Mr. Broadbent could not agree as to the stability of
his condition, nor could they agree as to the severity of his
injuries.

Mr. Broadbent correctly points out that he received at

least the following ratings from various doctors:

April 23, 1984

(20%); September 5, 1984 (5%); May 26, 1987 (16%); February 2,
1988 (15%); and September 18, 1990 (24%).
10.)

(Broadbent Brief at

It is difficult to understand how Mr. Broadbent can assert
-14-

that these numbers, somehow, show that his condition was fixed as
of June, 1983 and his permanent partial disability rating could
have been determined at that time.
Mr. Broadbent also claims that his temporary total
disability payments concluded on June 10, 1983, and that his
permanent partial compensation was, therefore, payable the
following day.

The record shows, however, that Mr. Broadbent

received total temporary disability payments, at various times,
up to May 10, 1988.

(R. 87, 88, 89, 91.)

If it is assumed that

his condition was fixed as of that date, the earliest interest
could be assessed in this case, is May 11, 1988, pursuant to the
first sentence of R490-1-12B.2.
Although Mr. Broadbent acknowledges that his impairment
ratings were all over the board for the years 1984 through 1991,
(Broadbent Brief at 10), he attributes this to the inability of
doctors to agree on the rating.

He argues that because he

returned to work in 1983, his condition had stabilized as of that
time.

(Id.) He chooses to ignore the clear opinion of Dr.

Bender that his condition had not stabilized during that time
period.

On September 18, 1990, at the request of his attorney,

Mr. Broadbent was evaluated by Dr. John M. Bender. (R. 157.)

In

his report, Dr. Bender states, "In review of these extensive
medical records, which cover the past 8 years, it is apparent
that Mr. Broadbent has a progressive problem which is undoubtedly
more impaired at this time than several years ago."
-15-

(R. 157,

emphasis added.)

It is clear, through Dr. Bender, that Mr.

Broadbent's condition was not "fixed" for rating purposes as late
as September 1990.

Therefore, under the second sentence of

R490-1-12B,2., the Industrial Commission's decision was
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
CONCLUSION
Under the circumstances of this case, the Industrial
Commission was correct in awarding interest from the date the
medical panel established Mr. Broadbent!s impairment rating and,
therefore, its order of May 29, 1992, should be affirmed.
DATED this

£l *Tday of October, 1992.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By: N t s ^ t^>

:uart L. Poelmatn
Ryan E. Tibbitts
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four (4) copies of BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS this
22nd day of October, 1992, to the following:
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
Industrial Commissioner of Utah
Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Esq.
SYKES & VILOS, P.C.
311 South State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

C^-^ L\

Stuart L. Poelman
Ryan E. Tibbitts
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents

ADDENDUM A

JUN 0 1 1992
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Fred Broadbent,
Applicant,
vs.
Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial Indemnity,
Employers' Reinsurance Fund,
Respondent.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*

DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR REVIEW AND
DENIAL OF APPLICANT'S
MOTIONS FOR REVIEW
IN PART
Case No. 90000918

*
*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motions for
Review of applicant Fred Broadbent and respondents Tolboe
Construction and Industrial Indemnity in the above captioned
matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and
Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant and the respondents Tolboe Construction and/or
Industrial
Indemnity submitted Motions for Review of the
administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision in the above captioned
case. The applicant submitted two Motions for Review of the ALJ's
decision of March 9, 1992, one on March 18, 1992, and the second
one on April 6, 1992. Both were timely filed.
The above named respondents submitted their response to
applicant's first motion on April 8, 1992, and also, on that date
timely submitted their Motion for Review. On April 20, 1992, the
applicant responded to respondent's April 8, 1992 reply to
applicant's Motion for Review, and on April 24, 1992 responded to
respondent's Motion for Review.
Respondents provided a further
reply on May 12, 1992 to applicant's Motion for Review of April 6,
1992.
All parties need to be aware that responses to motions for
review must be filed with the Commission within 15 days of the
mailing date of the motion for review, or such responses may be
considered untimely.
U.C.A. Section 63-46b-12 (1953 as amended
1988) . Since there were untimely responses from all parties, and
because we have received no objections to the untimely filings, we
will consider the responses.
Relevant facts are as follows. The applicant sustained an
industrial accident on October 6, 1982. Tolboe Construction and
Industrial Indemnity paid medical expenses and temporary total
disability benefits (TTD).
The respondents claim that the
applicant refused tender of payment for permanent partial
disability (PPD) due to a disagreement as to the correct PPD
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rating. The tender was made on June 4, 1987. The applicant filed
an application for hearing in October 1990.
In answer to the hearing application, respondents denied
liability for PPD compensation asserting that the Industrial
Commission of Utah (IC) is precluded from making a PPD award at any
time subsequent to eight years after the date of the accident, and
basing this assertion on U.C.A. Section 35-1-66. By order dated
March 9, 1992, the ALJ awarded the applicant PPD benefits, but did
not address the eight year limitation provision contained in the
statute.
Because of a series of disputes between the parties, and among
the physicians, as to the proper PPD rating, the ALJ referred this
case to a medical panel. On December 10, 1991, the panel awarded
the applicant a 23 percent impairment rating. The ALJ adopted the
medical panel impairment rating of 2 3 percent, and ordered that the
applicant's compensation be paid in a lump sum plus interest of
eight percent from December 23, 1991.
The only issue raised in applicant's Motion for Review dated
March 18, 1992 was whether the date of December 23, 1991 was the
proper date for the interest to begin accrual. The applicant
contends that interest should begin on June 9, 1983 which is the
day after the date upon which the applicant's TTD was terminated.
Alternatively, the applicant argues that if the Commission decides
that the interest should not begin on that date, the interest
clearly should begin on April 23, 1984 which is the date that the
applicant met the standard for a permanent partial impairment
rating of 20 percent.
The respondents argue that the ALJ was correct in ordering
that interest on the PPD award commenced on December 23, 1991 since
that was the date that the liability of the respondents was first
medically determined. We agree with the respondents on this issue.
The Utah Supreme Court has discussed the rationale behind the
award of interest on workers compensation benefits:
Thus, it is clear that compensation for worker
disability is legislation for the public welfare. It is also clear that the statute providing for interest on unpaid benefits was a
legislative attempt to remedy a serious social
problem: the depreciation of the value of benefits as a result of non-receipt of the weekly
benefit for months, or perhaps years, until a
final determination of eligibility and an award
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was made.
Marshall 'v. Ind. Comm'n, 704 P.2d 581, 583 (Utah 1985).
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 provides in pertinent part:
Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from
the date when each benefit payment would have
otherwise become due and payable.
1953 as amended 1981.
Further, our rules state that:
For the purpose of interest calculation, benefits
shall become "due and payable" (as used in Section
35-1-78, U.C.A.) as follows:
•

2.

*

*

Permanent partial compensation shall be
due and payable on the next day following the termination of a temporary total
disability. However, where the condition
is not fixed for rating purposes, the interest shall commence from the date the
permanent partial impairment can be medically determined.

Emphasis added; Rule 490-1-12 (Utah Admin. Code 1991).
There has been no allegation by the applicant of bad faith or
dilatory tactics on the part of the respondents in paying the
interest. Our decision on the award of interest may be different
in cases where the employer cannot show that it proceeded with some
dispatch to provide payments to injured employees who were entitled
to such payments.
Under the circumstances, interest accrues from the date of
December 23, 1991 as correctly determined by the ALJ.
The applicant in his Motion for Review dated April 6, 1992
also argues that he has never received reimbursement for his
travel.
The ALJ Order is silent as to this issue, and the
respondents' reply to applicant's motion argues that the Order did
not contain any consideration of the mileage claim because the
applicant did not submit itemized information reflecting the
particular amounts of mileage expense claimed for the various
periods involved to the ALJ as the ALJ had ordered. The applicant
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has not responded to this allegation of respondents so we will
treat this statement by the respondents as true for purpose of our
decision.
The current pertinent rule which was effective on March 16,
192 provides that:
An employee who, based upon his/her physician's advice, requires hospital, medical,
surgical, or consultant services for injuries arising out of and in the course of
employment and who is authorized by the
self-insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial
Commission to obtain such services from a
physician and or hospital shall be entitled
to [certain reimbursements].
R568-2-19A (Utah Admin. Code 1992).
The rule further provides that n[r]equests for travel
reimbursement must be submitted to the carrier for payment within
one year of the authorized care. R568-2-19B4 (Utah Admin. Code
1992) .
Therefore, such mileage reimbursement requests are
authorized under the current rule as an expense which can be passed
on to the carrier or employer unless the employee does not submit
such request for reimbursement within one year of the authorized
care.
The applicant does not fall under the current rule since he
was injured in 1982, and since he clearly filed his application
before the effective date of the new rule.
Therefore, the
requirement that the applicant submit his requests for travel
reimbursement to the carrier within one year of the authorized care
will apply in his case only to those medical treatments, and other
circumstances within the mileage reimbursement rule which were
incurred subsequent to March 15, 1992.
Carriers should not impose rigid and onerous requirements on
injured employees to prove mileage expenses. Such requirements are
contrary to the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. However,
the carrier may reasonably require the injured employee to show
that he/she attended a medical appointment or other required
treatment along with a statement from the injured employee showing
the mileage from the home/work of the employee to the place of
treatment and return.
Rather than the carrier simply stating that the burden has not
been met, it is incumbent upon the carrier to tell the employee
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precisely what will be reasonably needed to substantiate the
reimbursement. Preferably this should be discussed, among such
items as how the claim will be processed, early in the process when
the carrier assigns an adjuster to the case. Such a discussion
will avoid much of the contention presented by arguments over
mileage as presented in this case.
We do not have sufficient information on which to approve or
disapprove applicant's claim for mileage in this case.
The
applicant has provided us with a list of the mileage amounts
claimed for the various years. Had the applicant provided this
list more punctually, it could have been considered by the ALJ.
However, in the interest of conserving time, we will dispose of
this issue.
The carrier must do more than say that the amounts are old and
unsubstantiated. The applicant has listed the day, month, and year
for most of his trips, the medical practitioner or facility
visited, and the number of miles. The carrier presumably has the
medical records and bills which it paid to verify these trips. It
would seem that sufficient information has been provided on which
the carrier can determine the claim. Since the applicant was late
turning in his claim, the carrier will have ten days from the
issuance of our order in which to provide us more information about
its specific objections, and about what it needs in the way of
substantiation which are not within its records of the case, or we
will approve the amounts claimed.
The remaining issue to be discussed, and which is the only
issue raised by the respondents in their Motion for Review is
whether U.C.A. Section 35-1-66 of the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act prohibits the Commission from making an award to the applicant
of permanent partial disability after eight years from the date of
applicant's injury.
The statute in question reads:
The Commission may make a permanent partial
disability award at any time prior to eight
years after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting
from such injury is not finally healed and
fixed eight years after the date of the injury and who files an application for such
purpose prior to the expiration of such
eight-year period.
Emphasis added. (1953 as amended 1981).
The ALJ Issued his decision more than nine years after the
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date of injury. This precludes the Commission from ordering
respondents to pay an award of permanent partial disability to
applicant argue the respondents. To buttress this argument,
respondents further contend that the delay in seeking
Commission's award was caused by the applicant.

the
the
the
the

The vise of the word "may11 clearly shows that the Commission is
not required to make such award within the eight year period,
although it may do so. This particular statute is applicable to
those situations where the applicant's condition has not
stabilized, but the applicant desires that his medical condition be
rated even though under normal circumstances no rating would be
provided until stabilization.
Under these circumstances, such
applicant can force a rating if requested prior to the expiration
of the eight year period.
In this case, the applicant clearly filed his application
before the eight year period.
For these reasons, the Commission affirms the ALJ's decision.
There is substantial evidence in light of the entire record to
uphold the findings of the ALJ, and his conclusions of law are
appropriate under the circumstances.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated March 9, 1992 is affirmed.
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the respondents shall have ten
days from the date of issuance of this Order to provide to the
Commission any specific objections to the mileage reimbursement
request shown at Exhibit A, Applicant's Motion for Review filed on
April 6, 1992. The applicant shall have ten days from the date of
service upon him to respond to respondent's objections, if any.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 3 5-1-86, and 63-46b16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
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transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.
.'ill.

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
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